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Searching for a Place to Call Home: 
The Challenges Facing Europe’s 
Cosmopolitan Citizens
Jessica L. Hawkinson
I. Introduction
Author Ulrich Beck writes that processes of globalization encour-
age a sort of “transnational place polygamy,” in which migrating 
individuals become attached to “several places at once, belonging in 
different worlds” through a process of cultural mixing, adaptation, and 
the “globalization of biography.”1 For students, modern professionals, 
and even tourists, increased opportunities to travel, study, and work 
abroad magnify the “globalization of biography” that Beck identifies. 
For migrant communities, however, the experiences of “transnational 
place polygamy” can often be more harrowing than the experiences of 
the average tourist or student. Indeed, many families and communities 
find themselves stretched painfully between multiple localities across 
thousands of miles. In the search for belonging, many individuals find 
that “home” no longer corresponds with political, legal, or territorial 
boundaries. In addition, many find official acquisition of European or 
Western citizenship and residence increasingly difficult or impossible.
Macalester College’s Institute for Global Citizenship program on 
Globalization in Comparative Perspective provides a particularly 
appropriate context from which to analyze the complexities of global-
ization and the difficulties of transnational identity formation faced by 
migrants. This essay serves as a capstone to my research and experi-
ences as a student at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) 
at the University of London, and at the University of Maastricht in the 
Netherlands. Despite the vastness of comparative possibilities between 
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the two semesters abroad, the central focus of my independent research 
is an exploration of the legal obstacles that are faced by minority com-
munities seeking to integrate into European society. The goal is to 
reflect on the challenges of legal integration for ethnic minorities in 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The essay will conclude 
that obstacles to pluralism represent the larger difficulties that states 
confront in managing globalization and dynamic international affairs. 
In order to meet the stated goals, this article will be divided into four 
main parts. The first will describe in more depth the area of focus and 
outline its importance. The second part will apply relevant research 
materials and experiences from my first semester studying in London, 
while the third section will rely on resources from a second semester in 
Maastricht, Netherlands. A final component will explore the relevance 
of “globalization of biography” to the larger phenomenon of globaliza-
tion itself.
II. Definition of Focus and its Importance
The modern era of globalization is characterized by unprecedented 
movement and migration—of capital, cultures, ideas, and people—
both across and within borders. The movement of people can be a 
positive development, particularly where multiculturalism nurtures 
tolerance, cultural exchange, and innovation. In contrast, individu-
als who embody multiple cultural codes can come into conflict with 
the traditional state conceptions of minority rights, citizenship, and 
cultural identity. The focus of this essay approaches the phenomenon 
of globalization from a cultural perspective, using theories from both 
political science and international studies. While the globalization of 
culture can be studied from a variety of perspectives (the most com-
mon being related to anthropology, philosophy, and the humanities), 
viewing the cultural impacts of globalization from the perspective of 
current international affairs and law offers two advantages. First, the 
field of political science offers strong theoretical traditions which help 
define the role of the state and its relations with other state and non-
state actors in the international system. The growing robustness of 
the European Union and the increasing number of migrants crossing 
European borders are phenomena that challenge traditional political 
theories and encourage new ones. Secondly, the impact of multiple 
cultures on individuals and national polities is most clearly illustrated 
in the legislation and political rhetoric emerging from international 
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political affairs. Legislation that places increased restrictions on “non-
Western” migrant communities is of particular importance as a result 
of its relevance to increased isolationism following the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, and the attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 
and 2005. Understanding state legislation is equally valuable for its 
ability to reflect attempts at creating national political identity—often 
to the detriment of migrants and aliens seeking entry or asylum.
The topics of multiculturalism and transnational identity are vital 
for a variety of reasons. One of the most important results of increased 
migration and the amalgam of cultural codes it creates is that the 
nations of the world are forced to re-evaluate the relevance of tradi-
tional territorial identities in light of increasing cosmopolitanism. The 
plurality of identity identified by Beck and others speaks to a larger 
discussion of global citizenship and global community.2 For nation-
states that have retained their sovereignty for centuries, global citizens 
are often seen as obstacles rather than assets. Fragmented legal and 
political responses to immigration, integration, and citizenship rep-
resent the dilemmas of cultural globalization facing states today. As 
Will Kymlicka notes, “finding morally defensible and politically viable 
answers” to the challenges of diversity and human rights is “the great-
est challenge facing democracies today.”3 In the end, pluralism and 
global citizenship offer unique theoretical challenges for scholars, but 
they are most important for their potential to redefine the nature of 
democratic statehood in an era of globalization. Cosmopolitanism and 
the recognition of multiple cultural identities could provide a unique 
avenue for defining a global community based on democratic values.
A final note on the European geographical focus should also be 
put forward briefly. Pluralism and multicultural developments in the 
European Union are of particular relevance today. First, the birth and 
growth of the European Union illustrates another facet of globaliza-
tion: supranational economic and political governance. This supra-
national element may prove vital in creating political structures that 
accommodate global citizenship. Secondly, the European Union, one of 
the most ambitious transnational integration projects to date, has intro-
duced legislation that gives foundation to the rights and obligations of 
European nationality and citizenship. This legislation makes it the first 
non-state polity that can confer the rights and obligations of citizen-
ship. Third, in sharp contrast to the apparent success of this universal-
izing political effort, the shift toward multiculturalism and pluralism 
is a continuous struggle for the democracies of the European Union. 
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Legal resistance to non-Western immigration and waning support of 
ethnic minorities in many European countries confirms this conflict. 
Finally, as a result of my research in Great Britain and the Netherlands, 
geographical narrowing was convenient. A more thorough compara-
tive study would benefit from the inclusion of both additional Euro-
pean and non-European cases.
III. Research from the Fall Semester in the United Kingdom
A. History of Multiculturalism in the United Kingdom
The Institute for Public Policy Research estimates that 678,000 individ-
uals born outside of the United Kingdom currently call London home.4 
Despite the existence of diverse cities like London and statistics that 
suggest a non-white ethnic minority presence of almost 8% across the 
whole of the United Kingdom, the struggle to welcome difference is 
still very real for politicians and policymakers. This section will briefly 
outline the modern development of the ethnic minority presence in the 
U.K. This diversity is apparent upon walking through London streets 
filled with diverse languages, schools, places of worship, outdoor mar-
kets, and restaurants. The goal of this section is to offer a synopsis of 
the obstacles ethnic minorities face when attempting to become a part 
of British society. Engaging primarily with texts and case studies from 
a SOAS course entitled Ethnic Minorities and the Law, the section will 
outline the ethnic minority presence in the U.K., followed by reflec-
tions on British perspectives on pluralism and national identity. The 
section will conclude with several case studies relevant to the topic of 
ethnic minority integration and citizenship in the U.K.
As a result of Britain’s colonial past, the issue of migration and 
citizenship has been a prominent one in British legislation. As Randall 
Hansen notes, “at the empire’s peak in the twentieth century some 
600,000,000 individuals had the technical right to enter the UK and 
avail themselves of all the rights now associated with British citizen-
ship.”5 Though small groups of minority communities existed before 
the 1940s, much of the significant immigration occurred under the 
1948 British Nationality Act, which still maintained the right of colo-
nial subjects to enter the U.K. freely.6 From 1948 until 1962, the existing 
British Nationality Act supported the entrance of over 500,000 non-
white British subjects from the Commonwealth. As ethnic minority 
communities grew, the U.K. was forced to recognize the foundations of 
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a multicultural society. Throughout the 1950s, however, the liberal Brit-
ish perspective on the freedoms of Commonwealth subjects began to 
change.7 As a result, changes in legislation in 1962 increased immigra-
tion controls and discouraged non-white migrants from seeking entry 
into the U.K.8 Although a variety of legal developments discourage 
multicultural migration, Great Britain has not been able to ignore the 
reality of an existing and significant multicultural community. Euro-
pean migration has also played a role in the development of an ethnic 
minority presence, while migration from New Commonwealth coun-
tries in the West Indies, the Indian subcontinent, and East Africa has 
solidified Britain’s status as a multicultural polity.9 As Hansen notes, 
the predominantly non-white immigration from “new” common-
wealth countries peaked in the years leading up to 1962.
Despite legislative changes that continue today, however, Britain’s 
multicultural community continues to grow both in size and diver-
sity. According to the 2001 Census, half of the U.K.’s non-white ethnic 
minority population is of Indian, Pakistani, or Bangladeshi origin.10 
This amounts to over three percent of the total population. Addition-
ally, just under two percent of the total population, or around 25 per-
cent of the ethnic minority population, represents black Caribbean and 
black African communities.11 Individuals with mixed ethnic identity 
represent 1.2 percent of Great Britain’s total population, and account 
for approximately 15 percent of the ethnic minority presence.12 As cur-
rent events and security concerns prompt worries over a diversifying 
population, Britain’s policymakers and academics continue to contend 
with the subject of ethnicity in law. The current failure to accommodate 
difference and define a dynamic British identity suggests that the U.K., 
like other European nations, is finding it difficult to navigate a road 
towards pluralism.
B. Legal Obstacles
Several perspectives on integration and pluralism underlie the legisla-
tion on immigration and nationality in the U.K. Whether legislation 
demands assimilation or searches out pluralism, the confusion and 
incompleteness of many laws suggests an incomplete and multifaceted 
understanding of what a multicultural democracy should embody. 
Several legal developments will be discussed here. The 1962 Com-
monwealth Immigrants Act marked the first time that immigration 
and nationality legislation began to define British nationality in terms 
Macalester International  Vol. 20
64
of United Kingdom residency and “belonging,” rather than by official 
citizenship and passport possession.13 Under the 1962 Act, a system of 
labor vouchers was employed in order to police the entry of unskilled 
workers. Particularly those with non-white ethnic backgrounds were 
affected.14 As Randall Hansen writes, the most important impact of the 
legislation was to deny “millions of largely non-white ‘colonial’ Brit-
ish subjects across the globe” the rights and opportunities normally 
associated with British nationality.15 The 1962 Act was the first of many 
changes that would radically redefine the British legal approach to the 
immigration and naturalization of ethnic minorities.
The second significant change in British legislation was the 1971 
Immigration Act. This Act officially codified the earlier Acts of the 
1960s, and also introduced a system of immigration “rules” that, 
although not legislation, could be used as legal guidance for the admin-
istration of the Act.16 These rules often meant that immigration officials 
could haphazardly interpret the 1971 Act. The 1971 Immigration Act 
had serious consequences for Commonwealth subjects seeking entry 
into the U.K. While the 1962 Act established the recognition of differ-
ences between passports issued under U.K. central authorities and 
those issued by colonial offices, the 1971 Act reinforced these differ-
ences through a new concept known as “patriality.”17 Beginning with 
the 1971 Act, Commonwealth subjects seeking entry clearance to the 
U.K. would need to prove that either they or their parents or grandpar-
ents were born on U.K. soil.18 In short, the 1971 Act had the permanent 
effect of placing “Commonwealth citizens on the same legal footing as 
aliens for the purposes of immigration.”19 For many Commonwealth 
subjects from former British colonies in Africa, the impact of the 1971 
Act was particularly acute. Indeed, the 1971 Act was initially conceived 
as a way to quell official and public resistance to the possibility of a 
mass immigration of Kenyan Asians with British nationality follow-
ing Africanization policies in Kenya.20 Nuruddin Farah also notes that 
opposition to African migration was later repeated when the British 
Nationality Act of 1981 was passed in response to the immigration 
of Ugandan Asians following their expulsion from Uganda under Idi 
Amin’s rule.21 Though the 1971 Act was not a direct result of the Ugan-
dan crisis which occurred in 1972, Ugandan Asians, many of whom 
also held British passports, were either accepted into the U.K. as refu-
gees or were turned away if they could not prove patriality under the 
stringent provisions of the 1971 Act.22 Nonetheless, the 1971 Act had 
obvious implications for Commonwealth citizens seeking the protec-
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tion of the British government, particularly in cases in which indepen-
dence movements brought civil unrest and governmental instability.
From the perspective of the Commonwealth, the 1971 legislation 
meant an oppressive immigration regime which closed the doors of 
British legal rights to anyone who could not prove patrial family lin-
eage, U.K. birth, or a five-year residence permitted by labor vouchers.23 
In contrast, Great Britain may have viewed the 1971 Act as a way to 
prepare itself for the arrival of European migrants upon its entry into 
the European Union in 1973. As Sanjiv Sachdeva explains, the 1971 Act 
reflected a move toward European Economic Community provisions, 
which gave European citizens primacy over those from the colonial 
states.24 Britain’s efforts to meet the demands of European Union mem-
bership are not enough, however, to excuse the global implications of 
the 1971 Act. As Nuruddin Farah writes, the 1971 Act had a clearly 
“racist logic” underneath it—a logic that meant “one was treated dif-
ferently if one came from what was referred to as the Old Common-
wealth…Ready to join…the European Community, Britain has lately 
negotiated away its imperial responsibility.”25 Whether the 1971 Immi-
gration Act is a matter of Britain’s successful European integration or 
one of postcolonial irresponsibility, its impact on Commonwealth sub-
jects and the atmosphere of exclusion it has created continue to exist 
today.
Perhaps the most important legal development after the 1962 Com-
monwealth Immigrants Act is the more recent British Nationality Act 
of 1981. The 1981 Act radically redefined the legislation surround-
ing nationality and citizenship in the U.K. and the Commonwealth. 
Its most important effect was to replace the more liberal 1948 British 
Nationality Act with three new types of citizenship that made distinc-
tions between full British (or patrial) citizenship, British Dependent 
Territories Citizenship, and British Overseas Citizenship.26 As Andrew 
Geddes writes, the creation of official British Overseas Citizenship (or 
BOC) largely stripped Commonwealth citizens in East Africa of any 
rights associated with their ties to British nationality.27 For the count-
less individuals who had once been considered British nationals under 
colonial rule, the 1981 legislation meant that their British citizenship no 
longer had any rights associated with it.28 In the end, even the strict-
est legislation embodied by the 1981 Act could not completely close 
Britain’s doors to the flow of family members and asylum seekers who 
would cross its borders in the decades following the new National-
ity Act. Try as it might, the U.K. and its government officials cannot 
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ignore the reality that Britain is a growing multicultural polity with the 
potential to be either innovative or destructive in the development of a 
cosmopolitan democracy.
While the challenges regarding the immigration of British Overseas 
Citizens have not disappeared altogether, more modern attempts to 
control immigration have centered on the control of asylum applica-
tions. The 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, the 1996 Asylum 
and Immigration Act, and four additional Acts on immigration and 
asylum between 1999 and 2006 are the most recent attempts to manage 
immigration. While the impact of the earlier Acts can be evaluated, the 
scholarly research on the most recent Acts is limited or nonexistent. 
Because of space constraints, the modern legislation will be discussed 
more generally, outlining its universal impacts and motivations. The 
1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act was the first to respond 
to massive increases in immigration during the period from 1989 to 
1993. One impact of this Act was to introduce a body of legislation that 
dealt specifically with “the backlog of asylum cases” that confronted 
officials in the early 1990s.29 The legislation limited not only the num-
ber of asylum-seekers who were given official refugee status, but also 
withdrew the government provision of housing for asylum-seekers.30 
Even so, the 1993 Act did not officially have an impact on the number 
of applications for asylum overall; indeed, the applications continued 
to rise dramatically after 1993.31 Even so, the 1993 Act had the impact 
of increased refusals and a decrease in the numbers of asylum-seekers 
given Exceptional Leave to Remain, or ELR. As a Home Office report 
notes, “In 1993, 48 per cent of initial decisions were to grant ELR and 
46 per cent were refused asylum. In 1995, 16 per cent were granted ELR 
while 79 per cent were refused.”32
The Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 also sought to limit asy-
lum applications by denying many asylum-seekers welfare and hous-
ing benefits, and the absence of government efforts to remedy the 
social and economic deprivation that plagued the majority of asylum 
communities placed crushing responsibility on local organizations, 
which developed temporary, improvised, and uncoordinated solutions 
to widespread problems.33 Additionally, the 1996 Act removed the 
right of appeal within the U.K. for asylum-seekers who first traveled 
through another country considered “safe” by immigration officials 
before arriving in the U.K.34 Overall, as Andrew Geddes observes, each 
new Act passed on asylum between 1993 and today has “sought to 
correct the errors of the previous legislation.”35 The result, in the end, 
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is a collection of asylum legislation that seeks both to close off exter-
nal borders and to build more complicated internal measures for dis-
couraging asylum applications.36 Despite a legacy of tough legislation, 
however, the newest legislation passed in 2002 may hold some promise 
for a successful multicultural Britain. The 2002 legislation in particular 
began to seek out alternative routes to “positive immigration” in the 
form of the Highly Skilled Migrants Program. Increased attention to 
anti-discrimination legislation may also encourage new approaches to 
pluralism in the U.K.37 In the end, beginning to understand the social 
and legal impacts of immigration and nationality legislation will be an 
essential first step in moving forward the discussions about pluralism 
and integration in the United Kingdom and worldwide.
IV. Research from the Spring Semester in the Netherlands
A. History of Multiculturalism in the Netherlands
According to authors Jan Lucassen and Rinus Penninx, waves of immi-
gration and emigration in the Netherlands have existed for more than 
four centuries.38 Although the discourse and political rhetoric about 
these “newcomers” has changed over time, the challenges remain the 
same. Despite the long history of immigration in the Netherlands, this 
section is concerned specifically with the more modern realities of 
newcomers in the period following the Second World War.
Following the end of World War II, three categories of migration 
can be identified in the history of the Netherlands: those migrating for 
political reasons, as a result of economic factors, or as asylum-seek-
ers.39 First, the Netherlands saw an increase in political migration as a 
result of independence movements in its colonial territories. The first 
important group of migrants was from the Dutch colony in Indonesia. 
Lucassen and Penninx estimate that from 1945 to 1965, around 300,000 
migrants traveled from Indonesia to settle in the Netherlands.40 Fol-
lowing Japan’s occupation of Indonesia between 1942 and 1945, about 
120,000 Dutch nationals escaped political persecution and instability 
to return en masse to the Netherlands.41 In addition, these hundreds 
of thousands of native Dutch were joined by 180,000 mixed Dutch-
Indonesians (who were born to at least one Dutch parent and chose 
Dutch nationality over Indonesian nationality).42 Finally, the migra-
tion of a third group of Moluccans resulted from political instability 
in Indonesia in the late 1940s. Originally, the Moluccans served in the 
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Netherlands Indies Army and opposed the Indonesian government’s 
rule in an effort to gain Moluccan independence.43 The Indonesian 
government refused to negotiate with the Moluccans, and the Neth-
erlands government eventually agreed to allow the temporary migra-
tion of 12,500 Moluccans to the Netherlands.44 Initially, the Moluccans 
were housed in camps in the Netherlands, forbidden to work, and 
completely isolated from the larger Dutch society.45 Beginning in the 
1950s, the Moluccan community numbered approximately 32,000, and 
they were increasingly granted work opportunities and relocated to 
Dutch towns.46 Despite these attempts at integration, a Moluccan ter-
rorist group, comprised of second-generation Moluccan immigrants, 
carried out a series of attacks on Dutch soil between 1975 and 1978.47 In 
1977, terrorist occupation of a school and attacks on a Dutch train led 
to a forceful reaction on the part of the government to free hostages.48 
Following the attacks in 1977, Moluccan terrorism ceased. Now a more 
successfully integrated community of Moluccans and their descen-
dants numbers around 40,000.49
A second group of colonial migrants arrived between 1973 and 1975, 
when the approaching independence of Surinam threatened to bring 
an end to the substantial benefits of Dutch citizenship for the Surinam-
ese.50 Though the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 1954 
allowed the free movement of Surinamese citizens, the expiration of 
this provision upon Surinamese independence meant that thousands 
of Surinamese sought to take advantage of their “last chance” at the 
full rights associated with official Dutch citizenship. In 1975 alone, the 
Netherlands saw almost 40,000 Surinamese cross the Dutch border, 
bringing its population in the Netherlands to just over 100,000.51 In the 
end, almost a third of the Surinamese population immigrated to the 
Netherlands.52 Provisional data for the year 2007 estimate that more 
than 300,000 individuals of Surinamese origin or second-generation 
descent currently reside in the Netherlands.53
The second major reason for immigration to the Netherlands was 
a result of economic incentive, illustrated first by government sup-
ported guest-worker programs introduced in the 1960s, and later by 
more modern permanent economic migration.54 The first workers were 
recruited from Spain and Italy, though a larger percentage arrived 
from Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia during the mid-1960s. Like many 
other countries in Western Europe, the Dutch government believed 
that these “guest” workers would be resident in the Netherlands for 
the short term only, and the migrants initially acted under similar sen-
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timents. Again in following with other European countries at the time, 
the Netherlands ended its guest-worker programs in 1974, following 
the 1973 oil crisis, which led to massive economic restructuring and a 
decrease in the need for foreign labor.55 Though migration had existed 
for decades, the Netherlands began to realize quickly that the guest-
worker population was determined to stay.
More modern immigration as a result of economic motivations has 
been the more common type of movement since the 1970s. This devel-
opment has transformed the demographic composition of the minor-
ity presence in the Netherlands.56 Many of the Italians and Spaniards 
recruited during the 1960s returned to their home countries when labor 
opportunities declined, though large numbers of Turks and Moroccans 
stayed and invited their families to the Netherlands.57 Family forma-
tion also increased in the 1990s, as legal migrants invited spouses from 
their home countries to the Netherlands. Lucassen and Penninx write 
that by 1992, “the Turks and Moroccans constituted the largest groups 
of immigrants in the Netherlands (250,000 and 195,000 respectively) 
after the Surinamese.”58 Today the Turkish community in the Nether-
lands exceeds 360,000, if second-generation Turkish are included.59
In addition to political and economic migrants, large-scale asylum 
applications to the Netherlands began in 1974 following the end of 
official guest-worker programs. Rising trends in asylum applications 
began in the 1980s, with a record number of over 52,000 in 1994 alone.60 
Applications have decreased dramatically since 1994, although they 
increased between 2004 and 2005, when 12,350 applications for asylum 
were received.61
In conclusion, the modern history of migration in the Netherlands 
is both dynamic and multi-faceted. One report suggests that commu-
nities of non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands are as large as 
1.6 million, or ten percent of the country’s population.62 According 
to the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, first- and second-genera-
tion individuals with at least one parent born abroad make up 19.4% 
of the population in the Netherlands.63 The climate of immigration 
in the Netherlands may be changing yet again, influenced largely by 
the social tension that has increased following the murder of film-
maker Theo van Gogh in November 2004.64 Restrictive immigration 
and asylum policies, and continuing debates over family reunion and 
the social integration of minority groups suggest that the history of 
immigration to the Netherlands is far from complete.
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B. Legal Obstacles
The challenges of migration and the growth of multicultural communi-
ties in the Netherlands parallel a changing legal regime of immigration, 
integration, and asylum policies. Despite innovative commitments to a 
more inclusive and respectful “minorities policy” during the 1970s, 
contemporary immigration and integration policies have moved away 
from a focus on multiculturalism toward a focus on civic integration, 
or inburgering, policy.65 From the 1970s until today, two competing 
approaches have pursued divergent legal and political solutions to the 
challenges of a multicultural Dutch society.
The first approach toward minorities policy, prevalent between the 
1970s and early 1980s, was a result of “pillarization,” or verzuiling, 
which defined a political system of “institutionalised separateness” for 
Dutch religious and cultural communities.66 Though the recognition 
of separate pillars largely disappeared in the 1960s, policies directly 
affecting minority groups were influenced by the “identity-affirming” 
qualities of pillarization, though the recognition of separateness had 
largely disappeared by the 1960s.67 Perhaps the most influential legal 
development reflecting the affirming approach of this early period was 
the 1983 Minorities Policy. According to Andrew Geddes, this policy 
“saw the Netherlands as a multi-ethnic society with the expression of 
ethnic differences by immigrants an important part of their social iden-
tity, which should be protected.”68 The policy contained three central 
goals which advocated the promotion of minority equality before law, 
the promotion of “multiculturalism and the emancipation of ethnic 
communities,” and improvements in the social and economic realities 
of minorities.69 Combining legal equality with equal opportunities, the 
1983 Minorities Policy embraced a method for integration that did not 
require a renunciation of unique cultural identities.70 Dutch policies 
granting voting rights to residents with third-country national status 
after five years of legal residence make the Netherlands, to this day, 
one of the few states to grant limited political participation rights to 
non-nationals.71 Despite concerted attempts at encouraging a pluralis-
tic minorities policy, political changes and historical evaluations slowly 
began to erode the ambitious steps toward multicultural integration of 
the 1970s and 1980s.
It is difficult to pinpoint a single year or event between the 1980s and 
today that decided the official decline of the plural minorities policy, 
though several trends greatly stimulated the rising popularity of fewer 
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multicultural integration policies. First, political and academic statis-
tics in the late 1980s began to reflect a growing gap of inequality and 
marginalization between native Dutch and minority communities.72 As 
a result, political sentiments shifted, and multiculturalism was chal-
lenged by individuals seeking to encourage a universal commitment 
to “the Dutch way of life.”73 This new commitment is illustrated most 
recently by the introduction of the 2006 Integration Abroad Act and the 
2007 New Integration Act. While the 1983 Minorities Policy “explicitly 
safe-guarded” the cultural autonomy of minorities and rejected forced 
assimilation, modern policies focus on civic integration through inbur-
gering, or integration through adaptation.74 Among other conditions, 
the New Integration Act and the Integration Abroad Act place an obli-
gation on individuals applying for residence status in the Netherlands 
to achieve integration through an “integration programme…consisting 
of courses in Dutch and social and vocational orientation, career plan-
ning, social guidance.”75 The New Integration Act and the Integration 
Abroad Act follow legislation made with the 1998 Law on the Civic 
Integration of Newcomers, which requires “500 hours of language 
training and 100 hours of civic education” in order to meet integration 
requirements.76
In addition to changing political sentiments surrounding the pro-
cess of integration, the increasing size, diversity, and economic status 
of ethnic minority and immigrant communities confronted policymak-
ers at the turn of the century.77 Several legislative changes beginning 
in 1984 attempted to calm the growing excitement over the evolv-
ing identity of Dutch minority communities. First, the Nationality 
Act of 1984 presented significant challenges to newcomers seeking 
naturalization. The 1984 Act followed an attempt by right-wing poli-
ticians to reduce minority naturalization through a bill that would 
have excluded Surinamese immigrants from a “rapid naturalisation 
procedure…for persons who had lost their Dutch nationality.”78 While 
the 1984 Act was not as openly xenophobic, two modifications “were 
clearly related to the desire to restrict immigration.”79 First, the Act 
abolished the option for non-Dutch women to choose Dutch national-
ity after marriage to a Dutch citizen.80 As Groenendijk and Heijs note, 
this change had the effect of reducing the number of marriages whose 
primary purpose was to acquire Dutch nationality. A second provision 
granting stateless children born in the Netherlands Dutch nationality 
was also removed—introducing a three-year residence requirement, 
which would have the effect of preventing children born to stateless 
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Roma and Moluccan parents from acquiring Dutch citizenship.81 This 
same rule was also used to prevent stateless children’s parents from 
acquiring residence status and eventual citizenship. Overall, the shift 
in approaches to migration has been significant, and political and legal 
debates are far from over. In an era of globalization that encourages 
transnational communities and the free movement of people and cul-
tures, modern democracies face challenges unlike any seen in the past.
V. Citizenship, Identity, and Belonging in an Age of Globalization
Identifying the growth of multiculturalism among the world’s nations, 
along with state responses to this pluralism, is a useful first step in 
understanding that globalization demands innovative changes for the 
world’s individuals and polities. Macalester’s endeavor to explore the 
phenomenon of globalization within the context of a two-semester pro-
gram abroad is a unique example of a forum in which an understand-
ing of global citizenship can be cultivated. In my own particular case, 
two semesters in different European Union member states provided me 
with the opportunity to explore multicultural citizenship from the per-
spectives of the state and minority communities. Despite the economic 
innovation embodied in the progress of the European Union, political 
and legal jurisdiction still lies predominantly with state governments. 
Often this negatively impacts the potential successes of cosmopolitan 
citizens. The modern nation-state in many cases attempts to “discipline 
away” the complexities and dynamism of human cultures and plural-
ity of identity, while the cosmopolitan forces of globalization nurture 
and increase “transnational place polygamy.”82 Furthermore, multi-
cultural individuals find it difficult to identify solely with a national 
identity that is more stagnant than dynamic. It is an inescapable reality 
that the identities of individuals are no longer, if they ever were, tied to 
a single locality. In both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, as 
well as across the member states of the European Union and the world, 
globalization is challenging both state sovereignty and national iden-
tity. This is especially clear with the phenomenon of global citizenship. 
As John Tomlinson writes, the world is faced with the fact that “the 
shrinking of distance and complex interdependence of the globaliza-
tion process produces what we might call ‘enforced proximity.’ ”83 In 
other words, it is becoming much more difficult for individuals and 
states to dismiss the reality of a growing global society. Individuals are 
increasingly aware that choices made in their own lives have global 
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impacts, and states are equally conscious that isolation and homoge-
neity are no longer acceptable in an international community. With 
its variety of potential dangers and innovative promises, embracing 
a global cosmopolitan society may be the only way to manage the 
pluralities of identity that accompany a growing population of cos-
mopolitan citizens. As Tomlinson suggests, cosmopolitanism may be 
“the sort of cultural disposition people living in a globalized world 
need to cultivate.”84 It is also important to note that cosmopolitanism 
would not “insist that all values are equivalent, but would emphasize 
the responsibility that individuals and groups have for the ideas that 
they hold and the practices in which they engage.”85 A world of global 
cosmopolitanism would not be a cultural “free for all,” but would rep-
resent a world in which individuals can maintain their local identities 
while being able to “think beyond the local to the long-distance and 
long-term consequences of actions…and be able to enter into an intel-
ligent relationship of dialogue with others who start from different 
assumptions.”86 The state cannot, of course, be held wholly responsible 
for cultivating global citizens, but it is nonetheless the obligation of 
democratic polities to support their citizenry in the creation of the type 
of cosmopolitanism that Tomlinson and others identify. Cosmopolitan-
ism is both the promise and the risk of globalization, and it may also 
be the answer to effectively weathering globalization’s storms. Many of 
globalization’s best navigators are also its authors. Global citizens who 
redefine their identities with each cross-border excursion not only feel 
the pressures of globalization, but they are also the newest members of 
a growing global community. With the help of strong democratic lead-
ership, these citizens stand ready to encourage successful structures 
for global governance and international accountability. Like many of 
the international organizations that guide the global community today, 
however, the support of the world’s states is a necessary element for 
growth. Indeed, the strength of the democracy in an era of globaliza-
tion may depend on the nation-state’s capacity to begin cosmopolitan 
dialogue with its citizens and the rest of the world.
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VI. Conclusion
From the multicultural marketplaces and international avenues of cen-
tral London, to the household worries about “those people taking our 
jobs” in small towns throughout England, and to the larger fear of 
terrorism caused by threats on U.K. soil, the impact of diversity can be 
felt. In the small city of Maastricht, Netherlands, cosmopolitanism can 
be found in the kebab and satay restaurants, and in the multilingual 
Dutch, French, and English conversations, which are a daily occurrence 
between the Dutch and Belgian borders. The impact of cosmopolitan-
ism can also be found in the potentially oppressive “whiteness” of 
the city’s permanent population and in the stereotypes that minorities 
face when trying to become “Dutch.” The potential of cosmopolitan-
ism, of course, is neither absolutely positive nor negative. At its best, 
cosmopolitanism can support a multicultural community of endless 
diversity and cultural change, brought together in global responsibil-
ity and accountability. At its worst, the presence of cultural diversity 
can become oppressive—breeding hatred, violence, and illusions of 
cultural and moral supremacy that threaten to separate the world into 
culturally based centers of opposition. In either case, the role that the 
nation-state plays in the current decades is essential in creating a global 
environment in which the core values of democracy can be given cos-
mopolitan relevance. As many of the world’s global citizens search for 
a place to call home, their globalized biographies can be an instructive 
way to explore the potential of cultural diversity and cosmopolitanism 
that is nurtured by the powerful forces of globalization. In the end, for 
all of us to call the world “home” would be a powerful step toward the 
creation of an international community with the capacity to confront 
some of the most pressing global challenges. •
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